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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR GRAHAM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
EVAN E. STREET and MAX 
SIEGEL, 
Defendants and Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
Case No. 
7883 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, EVAN STREET 
This case has been before the Fourth District Court 
since May of 1944. It has been before this court twice. 
The first time was on appeal from the interlocutory de-
cree entered by the Fourth District Court. The interlocu-
tory decree was affirmed by this court F'ebruary 15th, 
1946. When the remittitur sent this case back to the 
Fourth District Court to take the accounting, Judge 
William Stanley Dunford ordered that the accounting 
be filed, and on September 3, 1946 the defendants each 
filed an accounting. Plaintiff filed objections to the ac-
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countings but the accountings, with very slight changes, 
were found by the court to be correct. 
The accountings (R. 52) showed $4965.58 as profits 
of the partnership, of which the plaintiff would be en-
titled to one half, or $2482~79, but reduced by whatever 
credits the defendants are entitled to. The court awarded 
the plaintiff a judgment on the accounting of $2974.01. 
If the item of $1932.00 for so-called idle time, which we 
will be able to demonstrate conclusively that the court 
should not have awarded the plaintiff, the plaintiff would 
only have had a judgment on the accounting of $2008.01. 
We point to these figures only to show that if the plain-
tiff had been willing to accept the accounting tendered by 
the defendants, and which the court has found to be sub-
stantially correct, this case would have been disposed of 
six years ago. 
Instead of accepting this accounting of the defend-
ants, the plaintiff on September 12, 1946, filed "Objection 
to Accounting by Defendants and Supplemental Com-
plaint" (R. 17). The filing of the supplemental com-
plaint by the defendant delayed the hearing on the ac-
counting for the reason that plaintiff by the supplemental 
complaint asked the District Court to reject the c:te-
counting which had been ordered by this court (R. 21), 
and instead prayed for: 
"II .... damages sustained to date hereof 
in the sum of $55,756.00, and for the further sum 
of $1271.00 per month from date hereof, until 
the said accounting is fully settled." 
"III. That the defendants and each of them 
account to the partnership of Graham and Street 
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for drunages sustained for loss of future rents, 
issues and profits, in the sum of $88,773.33." 
Thus, instead of seeking a probable recovery of 
about $2000.00, plaintiff prayed for the total of these 
two sums of $1-!-!,5:29.33, plus an additional $1271.00 per 
month frOin September 12, 1946. The defendants con-
tended that these proposed runendments to the complaint 
by which this enormous sum was requested, were beyond 
the scope of the original action and sought a writ of 
mandate in this court. The writ was denied, this court 
stating that it was the province of .the District Court 
to decide what runount should be awarded and then if 
plaintiff was dissatisfied an appeal could be taken. The 
following is the final paragraph of the decision of this 
court (191 P. (2) at 159): 
"If, after the final accounting is made, and 
a final decree is entered, either party is dissatis-
fied with the result, we will review on appeal all 
questions properly brought before us as to the 
merits of the substantive issues. Plaintiffs are 
complaining before they are hurt. If they are 
aggrieved by any ruling of the defendant court, 
they will have an opportunity to have it reviewed 
here on appeal from the final decree. But we will 
not attempt by mandamus or otherwise to super- · 
vise every stage in the proceedings of the district 
court. The defendant court has not violated any 
clear mandate from us. It follows that the per-
emptory writ prayed for must be denied, and the 
alternative writ heretofore issued is recalled. 
Costs to defendants." 
The remittitur from this court on this proceeding 
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-----------·--------~~-~ ~ 
was sent down April 19, 1948. The judgment in this ac-
tion was ente·red July 12,1952 (R. 121). 
This court may be interested in a more detailed 
statement of the facts occurring prior to the first appeal 
to this court, and for the convenience of the court we at-
tach a brief summary of the facts in Appendix A. We 
wish to give the court this background because the·re are 
two members of this court who were not on the court 
when the other two proceedings were heard by the court. 
We recognize that the matters determined by the court 
on the first appeal are, of courS'e, res adjudicata, and 
present these additional facts only for the information of 
the court, and not as a basis for further action by the 
court. 
THEORY OF THE TRIAL OF THE ACTION IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT AND DECISION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT AFFIRMING THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE. 
At the conclusion of the trial of this action before 
the Hon. Wm. Stanley Dunford, the Judge in entering 
his decision commented· on the nature of the action: 
"This is an action in which the equity juris-
diction of the court is appealed to to require an 
accounting of the partnership alleged to have been 
formed between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
Evan E. Street." (P .. 263 of Tr. of Evidence on 
1st appeal.) 
The court made Findings of F·act from which it 
found that a partnership had be'en formed between the 
plaintiff and the defendant,· Evan E. Street, and made 
specific findings as to the acts. of each of the defendants 
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during the existence of said partnership. Insofar as we 
deem them material to this part of the brief, we quote the 
following Findings (R. 84): 
Par. 7: 
"That the plaintiff and defendant, Evan E. 
Street, worked on the equipment so purchased, 
making necessary repairs thereon, until on or 
about ..August 16, 1943; * * * that on or about 
August 16, 1943, the said equipment was brought 
to American Fork, Utah, at the expense of the 
defendant Street, * * * that the defendant Evan 
E. Street was placed in charge of the equipment 
purchased as hereinabove set forth." 
Par. 13: 
"That subsequent to August 23, 1943, the de-
fendant, :Max Siegel, has collected all moneys 
earned in the operation of the partnership equip-
ment hereinabove set forth; that said defendant, 
Max Siegel, has paid only the operating costs and 
repairs of said equipment and has retained all of 
the profits of the operation of the said equip-
ment and partnership business; that the defend-
ant, Evan E. Street, operated the said equip-
ment from August 16, 1945 until January 12, 
1945; that the said defendant, Max Siegel still 
retains moneys belonging to the said Evan E. 
Street, from the agreement of conspiracy between 
them, pending the outcome of this action." 
Par. 16: 
"That plaintiff has requested the defendants, 
and each of them, to cease to collect money belong-
ing to the partnership, and misappropriate the 
same to their own use, and to deposit the money 
heretofore collected by them in the partnership 
account of Graham and Street, and that said de-
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------------------------------------------------
fendants, and each of thern, ~ave heretofore 
neglected and refused, and yet do neglect and 
refuse to account for the money collected, and do 
continue to conspire between themselves in order 
to deprive the plaintiff of his rightfUl interest in 
the rnoney belonging to the said partnership from 
the operation of the partnership business, and 
the sale of the partnership property." 
Par. 11: 
"That from and since August 23, 1943, the 
defendants have conspired to take possession of 
the partnership property of Graham and Street, 
to collect and misappropriate the funds earned in 
the operation of the equipment on the contracts of 
Graham and Street, and to exclude plaintiff from 
any management and control of the partnership 
business." 
That Par. 11 continues as follows: 
"and have continued to operate the said part-
nership and business until January 12, 1945." 
This finding that "they" operated seems contrary 
to the finding in paragraph 13, "that the defendant, Evan 
E. Street, operated the said equipment from August 16, 
1943 to January 12, 1945." The two fipdings are con-
sistent when it is explained that the equipment was 
physically operated by the defendant, Street, while the 
business operations of collecting and disbursing the 
moneys was handled by the defendant, Siegel. 
Approximately one month after the work was com-
menced by the partnership, and on or about September 
20, 1943, the plaintiff, Graham, and the defendant, Street, 
went to see the defendant, Max Siegel, at the request of 
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~la.."( Siegel. At that time a dispute ensued between all 
of the parties as to the ownership of the equipment and 
discussions followed concerning the existence of the 
partnership of Graham and Street, and the findings con-
tinue: 
"'That thereupon plaintiff advised defendants 
that he would then and there buy the equipment 
for the full purchase price plus interest from date 
of purchase, or that he would sell his interest in 
the partnership of Graham & Street to them. 
* * *" ( R. 85) 
That this court adjudicated that this discussion, 
looking to a termination of said partnership at will, did 
n~t, in fact, result in a termination -of the partnership 
on the date and the court said (R. 442) : 
"The evidence is that on September 22, when 
Graham learned what Siegel wanted him to agree 
to, he said he would hB.ve none of it; that there. 
was talk of each buYing out the other; that Street 
was willing to take his wages and call it quits ; 
that Siegel was willing to take $300.00 for his in-
terest and let Graham have the 'cat,' but no agreP-
ment was reached. Graham thought his interest 
was worth at least $1000.00." 
The court further stated (R. 442) : 
"We do not need to determine whether the 
-partnership was otherwise terminated * * *" 
and concluded: 
"That since Street used property belonging 
to the partnership, treating it as belonging to 
Siegel, refusing to account to Graham for the 
moneys collected for the use· of the tractor * * * 
the property will, in equity, be considered as being 
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used fnr the benefit of the Graham. Street partni~r­
ship and accounting of profits required to be 
made to this partnership." 
Street's misconduct was not in using the property 
for other than partnership purposes, for the finding of 
the court is that on August 16, 1943, and before there was 
any disagreement of any kind between any of the parties, 
"The defendant Evan E. Street was placed in charge 
of the equipment purchased." (R. 84, par. 7). His mis-
conduct consisted of "treating the sole piece of partner-
ship property, around the operation of which the part-
nership revolved, as the property of another and dealing 
with that other inconsistently with his partnership with 
Graham." (R. 442). Street would have split his profits 
with Siegel rather than with Graham, since Siegel claim-
ed title to thepiece of equipment (R. 441, reverse side). 
"At this meeting (on September 22nd) for 
the first time, he told Graham that he, Siegel, 
was the owner of the tractor and that he would 
rent it to Graham and Street for one third of the 
profits." (R. 441, reverse side) 
It is to be noticed that by the finding of this court, 
Siegel offered to rent the equipment to both Graham and 
Street and not to Street alone. This misconduct of 
Siegel found by this .court was that he participated in 
"this scheme to convert himself from a lender for interest 
to an owner and renter demanding profits," and that in 
this scheme "he induced Street to join him." This court 
held that it would prevent the culmination of such scheme 
by holding that "the property will in equity be considered 
as being used for the benefit of the Graham and Street 
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partnership and accounting of profits to be made to 
this partnership," and further that although under one 
or more of the events that occurred, the partnership 
under the ordinary law rules might have ceased to exist, 
.. that equity will nevertheless treat the partnership as 
existing and require an accotmting of the profits." (R. 
-1-12). 
Thus, Street's conduct in (1) treating the sole piece 
of partnership property as the property of another, and 
(2) in joining in the scheme of Siegel to convert himself 
from a lender to an owner or renter cost him not only 
the profits earned by his labor to the date when the part-
nership would otherwise have been dissolved, but also the 
profits earned byhis labor beyond that date and as long 
as he operated the property. :Mr. Justice Wolfe correctly 
recognized that the partnership at will might well have 
been deemed terminated on May 29, 1944, when the ex-
istence of the partnership was formally denied by Street 
in his answer to the complaint. This date might have 
been the latest date to which an accounting of the profits 
would have been required by the general principles of 
partnership law, but because of the above-mentioned mis-
conduct of the parties, this court permitted profits to 
accrue as long as there were profits. For their delicts, 
this court has determined that the defendants shall not 
profit, and Street was required to give up profits of his 
labor ·for a period extending beyond a date when the 
partnership might have been considered as dissolved. 
The interlocutory decree, as affirmed by this court, de-
cided that for all the delicts of the parties, the defendant, 
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Siegel, was to give up the share of the profits earned by 
the partnership equipment that he had claimed, and the 
defendant, Street, was required to give up the profits 
that were earned by the operation of the partnership 
equipment after the date when the partnership would 
otherwise have been considered as being delivered. 
Because of the delicts of the defendants, a full one 
half of the partnership profits were awarded the plain-
tiff. These profits amount to twice the amount the plain-
tiff testified his partnership interest was worth when a 
quarrel brought about the disruption of the partnership. 
This court had found that at the time of the disruption 
of the partnership "Graham thought his interest was 
worth at least $1000.00." (R.- 422). This defendant is 
only appealing from so much of the District Court judg-
ment as awards the plaintiff in excess of $2000.00. 
AFTER THE FIRST APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT 
PERMITTED THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT 
TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW 
THAT AN ACCOUNTING OF THE PROFITS 'WOULD NOT 
MAKE THE PLAINTIFF WHOLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF 
COULD BE MADE WHOLE ONLY BY ALLOWING HIM RE-
COVERY ON THE BASIS OF RENTAL VALUE OF THE 
EQUIPMENT BUT THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED THE 
PLAINTIFF RECOVERY ON THE BASIS OF RENTAL 
VALUE. 
After the r~mittitur was sent down by this court on 
the appeal from the interlocutory decree, the plaintiff 
filed a pleading labeled "Objection to Accounting by De-
fendants and Supplemental Complaint." (R. 17). The 
plaintiff there requested the court to reject the account-
10 
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ing of the defendants showing the partnership profits, 
eontending that because the plaintiff '•has been deprived 
of the management of the said business and of profits 
therefrom which would have exceeded the fair actual and 
reasonable rental Yalue of the equipment used in the op-
eration of the partnership business," that the plaintiff 
should recover, instead of the actual profits that had 
been earned by the partnership operation, an amount that 
would equal the reasonable rental value of the equipment 
that was used in the operation of the partnership busi-
ness. 
The second basis for recovery of the reasonable 
rental value was set out in paragraph 10 of this plead-
ing (R. 19): 
"That had the defendants been skilled in the 
management of the business of said partnership, 
and fully accounted to this court as ordered, they 
should have made in excess of the fair actual and 
reasonable rental value of the equipment used in 
the operation of the partnership business." 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
inade at the time of the entry of the final judgment, the 
District Court found as follows (R. 117, Par. 6): 
"From August 6, 1943 to December 26, 1944, 
the use of the assets of the partnership of Graham 
and Street, and the conduct of the partnership 
business were carried on by Street, assisted by 
Siegel, with reasonable diligence, with the excep-
tion of 34 days." 
This finding negatives the allegations of paragraph 
10 of the Supplemental Complaint, leaving only the one 
11 
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-----------------------~----------------~----~-~ 
complaint that "by fraudulent acts of the defendants, he 
(the plaintiff) has been deprived of the management of 
said business, and of profits therefrom which would have 
exceeded the fair actual and reasonable rental value of 
the equipment used in the operation of the partnership 
business." 
The one claim of the plaintiff was that the defendant, 
Street, was not skilled and should have earned more 
through the operation of the partnership equipment, but 
the finding is against plaintiff. It may be that the second 
basis of recovery is only corollary to the first, that is, 
that plaintiff was more skilled, and if not excluded from 
the management, the partnership would have earned 
more. There is no finding that plaintiff was more skilled 
in this business than Street. The only finding is (R. 118, 
par. 16) "The plaintiff, Graham, had experience and 
wide personal contacts which were denied the partnership 
by the acts of the defendants." 
The District Court did not award to the plaintiff a 
recovery based on the rental value of the equipment, 
and this is the subject of plaintiff's cross-appeal. We 
shall leave this point for discussion in our reply brief 
if the defendant bases his cross-appeal on that point. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ORDERED AN ACCOUNTING 
OF PROFITS AS SET OUT IN THE INTERLOCUTORY DE-
CREE AND WE AGREE WITH THIS RULE OF LAW. DE-
FENDANT STREET OBJECTS TO THE AWARD OF ADDI-
TIONAL AMOUNTS AS DAMAGES WHICH WERE 
NEITHER PRAYED FOR NOR PROVEN AND WHICH ARE 
IN EXCESS OF ANY DAMAGES THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE SUFFERED. 
12 
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'Ye have heretofore stated in our brief that the 
accounting made by the defendants and which was filed 
September 3, 19-!6, would have allowed the plaintiff a 
judgn1ent in an amount of $2482.79, less some credits 
which the defendants were entitled to and that this 
amount was close to the amoWlt of the judgment that the 
District Court has awarded to the plaintiff as an account-
ing of the profits made by the partnership. The District 
Court awarded a judgment in the an1ount of $297 4.01 
as plaintiff's share of the profits earned by the partner-
ship during the time of the partnership operation run-
ning from .August 16, 1943 to January 12, 1945. Inclu~ed 
in this amount is the award of $966.00 to Graham for the 
idle time to which we have already referred and which 
we shall hereinafter discuss. This award was made dt-
spite the fact that Graham exerted no effort on behalf of 
the partnership after September 22, 1943, and despite 
the fact that his complete investment in this venture was 
$15.00. 
This defendant conceives that the affirmance of the 
interlocutory decree by this court required the District 
Court to award the plaintiff an accounting of the entire 
profit made by the partnership. No objection is made 
by this defendant for this action of the District Court, 
but objection is made to the following additional awards 
granted to the plaintiff: 
(1) An award of $1932.00 for alleged idle tirne, 
one half of which arnount accrues to the bene-
fit of the plaintiff. 
(2) After awarding the plaintiff one half of the 
13 
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entire profit of the partnership, the coun 
granted plaintiff an additional $5000.00 as 
damages, though there was neither a pleading 
claiming such an amount nor facts to prove 
such damage. 
( 3) An award of $5000.00 punitive damages, al-
though there was no allegations of facts 
pleaded for punitive damages, the only de-
mand for punitive damages being in the 
prayer, amended during the trial. 
( 4) The allowance of interest on the amount 
found to be due by the accounting of profits. 
( 5) The disallowance by the court of the insur-
ance premium paid by this defendant for lia-
bility insurance on the equipment. 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT, STREET, OPERATED THE PARTNERSHIP 
DILIGENTLY BUT ERRED IN CHARGING THE DEFEND-
ANT WITH "IDLE TIME," FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
RECORD SHOWS THAT STREET WORKED DILIGENTLY 
AT ALL TIMES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTNER-
SHIP BUSINESS. 
The court arrived at this amount of $1932.00 in the 
following manner: He adopted the testimony of the 
plaintiff's witness on direct examination that the rental 
value of the "cat" was $773.00 per month and that the 
rental value of the "ripsnorter blade" was $193.00 per 
month, or $966.00 for both. The undisputed testimony 
is that this "ripsnorter blade" had never been removed 
from Bothwell's in Salt Lake City, from whom the equip-
ment was purchased, and that there never was any use 
for that piece of equipment and that it was never used 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by :Jir. Street (R. 316). Thus, if rental was to be corn-
puted at all it should have been computed only on the 
one item of $773.00 per month for the rental of the "cat." 
Now as to the facts as to whether there was actually 
any idle time. There was no evidence introduced by the 
plaintiff to show that :Mr. Street had wasted time or in-
deed that he failed to operate the "cat" at any time when 
he had jobs to do or when the weather permitted, or when 
the '"cat" was in operating condition. Mr. Street, how-
ever, testified that the equipment was operated con-
tinuously and at all times, except when its condition of 
repair or the weather would not permit (R. 280). 
With the evidence in that condition it did not occur 
to either the plaintiff or the defendants that there was 
idle time. The first suggestion of idle time appears in 
the memorandum decision of the court at the conclusion 
of the trial (R. 475.:6). The court there stated: 
"A test of the record, in the court's judgment, 
justifies the finding that from August 6, 1943 and 
up. to December 24, 1944, the use of the partner-
ship assets, and the conduct of the partnership 
business, were carried on by Street, assisted by 
Siegel, with reasonable diligence, with one excep-
tion. There were 507 total days as the court cal-
culates it, during which the court for convenience 
will call the partnership period. The equipment, 
as shown by Street's records, was idle 158 days 
during that period. There were 72 Sundays and 
16 other holidays occurring during that time, or a 
total of 88 holidays. The longest idle periodt:i of 
the equipn1ent, aside from the time when Street 
was working upon repairs, occurred in March, 
November and December of 1944. There was 36 
15 
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such days and they are easily accountable to bad 
weather. There are those 34 days of idleness 
which cannot reasonably be accounted for, except 
upon the general testirnony and inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, that Street was diligent. While 
these 34 days of unexplained idleness must be 
cha.Fged against Street, the account kept by him, 
with t4is exception, gives indication of diligence 
upon his part." 
The court should have been impelled to the opposite 
conclusion, namely: that if this defendant did not work 
on any particular days it must have been because .of the 
fact that the equipment was not in repair, or that the 
weather was bad, or that there was no work to do, rather 
than because of any lack of diligence on the part of the 
defendant. 
We should like to make the following calculation 
showing how the court arrived at these 34 days of idle-
ness and then make a calculation taken from the record, 
to show that, in fact, there were no idle days. The court's 
calculation taken from the foregoing evidence in tabular 
form would be as follows: 
Number of days in which equipment did not 
work---------------------------------------- 158 
Sundays ----------------------------------72 
Holidays ________________________________ 16 88 
Remainder 70 
Bad weather days ----·----------- 36 
Remainder 24 
We resp~ctfully submit that the following would be 
16 
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a Uttn·~ r~a~onable ealeulation to determine whether 
there were idle days. Following the exrunple of the court, 
we haYe also taken the trouble to carefully check Exhibit 
.. N .. and to count the nmnber of days upon which the 
equiprnent did not work and he has prepared a complete 
calendar eoYering the ntunber of hours that .ftllre .. worked 
l>y ~treet, during each one of the days of what the court 
has denon1inated the "partnership period," namely, 
bet\Yeen Aug-ust 6, 19±3 and up to December 26, 1944. 
Counsel's tabulation shows only 1-15 days, including 
Saturday, Sundays and holidays, upon which the equip-
ment was not worked, exclusive of the days upon which it 
was being repaired. Our tabular calculation therefore 
shows: 
~-~run her of days upon which equip1nent was 
not worked ---------------------------- 145 
Sundays ----------------------------------72 
Holidays --------------------------------16 
Saturday half days ____________ 36 124 
Remainder 21 
This remainder of 21 is more than accounted for 
by the court's finding that it would be reasonable to al-
low 36 days for days upon which the equipment could 
not be worked on account of weather conditions. Thus, 
there is actually no idle time. 
One final word should be said to show that Street 
was not lacking in diligence and that it is conceivable 
that he might even have lost a few days' time by reason 
of some illness during these sixteen rnonths. 
As to the seventeen days following December 26, 
17 
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1944, which was the last date upon which any work was 
done by Street, there would seem to be no reason to say 
that the time between December 26, 1944 and January 
12, 1945, when the "cat" was sold, should be considered 
as idl~ time. Street was going to join the U. S. Navy and w•~e.r.s 
the Roberts testified that Street was trying to 
sell the "cat" to him "somewhere around or before Christ-
mas" (R. 322). It was not in very good condition, as the 
purchaser of the "cat" has testified. On this point we 
should like to adopt what Mr. Mulliner has stated in 
Appellant Siegel's brief (P. 37): 
"There is likewise no evidence that for the 
17 days between December 26, 1944 and January 
12, 1945, this equipment was in condition to be op-
erated or that the weather would permit its opera-
tion. * * o~<· 
"The evidence is, without dispute, that it 
couldn't be operated when sold in January. In 
fact it was only after ten days in the shop and 
costly repairs (R. 325) that the buyer, Mr. 
Roberts, could operate it at all, and then it was 
too cold." (R. 325) 
Even if this were to be considered as time that Mr. 
Street should hav~ been working, the calculation which 
we· have made above shows that he has a credit available 
to himself for the extra time that he did work during 
the earlier period. We have shown that by allowing 
him half days on Saturdays, that in the period to Decem-
ber 26, 1944, there were only 21 d'ays on which work was 
not done, whereas the court allowed credit for 36 bad-
weather days, or a credit of 15 days, which can be applied 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
against this last period between December 26, 1944 and 
January 12, 1945, which period is for just 15 working 
days. 
We agree with and adopt the argument made in the 
brief of the appellant, Max Siegel, as filed ( P. 33-36), 
and particularly the points that this charge for idle time 
is not an element of partnership accounting or of darn-
ages, and, that if it were, it would have to be pleaded 
and proved. 
THERE IS NO OTHER LEGAL BASIS OF LIABILITY 
FOR THE AWARD OF $5000.00 DENOMINATED AS' COM-
PENSATORY DAl\IAGES. 
In the brief of the appellant, Siegel (P. 24), cases 
are cited for the proposition that. no action lies for the 
disruption of a partnership at will and we should like 
to cite the following additional case of Harris vs. Hirsch-
field (Calif.) 56 Pac. (2) 1253, which states: 
"No action will lie against a third person for 
inducing another to terminate a partnership at 
will. McGuire vs. Gerstley, 204 U.S. 489, 503; 28 
S.C. 332; 51 L. Ed. 581. 7' 
The Utah case of Karrick vs. Hannaman, 9 Utah 236 ; 
168 U.S. 328; 42 L. Ed. 484, 12 S. C. R. 135, cited at the 
same page of Mr. Mulliner's brief, is strictly in point. 
In Mr. Mulliner's brief for the appellant, Siegel, 
. at P. 16, he states : 
"Nothing is better settled than that no cause 
of action arises from a mere conspiracy to do 
something." 
He there cites Moropoulos vs. Fuller (Calif.) 200 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
___________ .., ________ .....,,..------ -~·--
Pac. 601 at 604. This case is quoted with approval in 
Aaronson vs. Bank of America (Calif.) 109 Pac. (2) 
1001: 
"The allegations of fraud and conspiracy are 
unsupported by any acts stated in the first and 
second counts, and standing alone as they do, con-
~titute pure conclusions on the part of the plead-
ers, insufficient to charge the defendants with any 
wrong." 
This doctrine is also approved in the case of Harris 
vs. Hirschfield (Calif.), 56 Pac. (2) 1253, which case 
also approves the Moropoulos case: 
"'l'urning to the final inquiry, a conspiracy is 
not actionable unless the conspiracy results i1i · 
the perpetration of: 
(1) An unlawful act or 
(2) Some injurious act by unlawful means.'' 
In the brief of the appellant, Siegel, cases are dis-
cussed concerning the probable liability for causing the 
plaintiff anxiety. We should like to point out that no-
where in the record is there any evidence that plaintiff 
suffered any more anxiety than any individual does when 
he enters into a business arrangement and something 
goes wrong with it. Defendant had anxieties, too, in 
trying to keep this old equipment going and plaintiff 
would have had more of them if he had not been relieved 
of this responsibility by the defendant, Street. 
The framers of the Uniform Partnership Act h::td 
full knowledge of the fact that an excluded partner suf-
fers anxieties, and yet the Act makes no provision for 
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special da1nages for the anxiety suffered. The Uniform 
Partnership .Art states, as we have already mentioned, 
that an excluded partner secures the value of his partner-
ship interest and profits attributable to the use of the 
partnership equip1nent after he is excluded, and nothing 
n1ore. It is a new thought in the law that anxiety fur-
nishes a foundation for legal liability. 
\Yhere plaintiff testified that he was "greatly humi-
liated" by the wrongful act of the defendant, our court 
denied recovery for the humiliation suffered. 
Rugg vs. Tolman, 39 Vt. 295; 117 Pac. 54 at 552• 
:\Ioreover, plaintiff did not plead that he suffered 
any mental or physical disorders because of the anxiety, 
nor indeed in the pleading did he plead that he had been 
caused any anxiety. Since such damages do not ordinar-
ily result from the injury complained of, in this case the 
disruption of a partnership at will, the law requires that 
such dan1ages be specially pleaded. 
See Quermbeck vs. Hanson, 94 Ut. 127, 75 Pac. (2) 
1027 at 10291 : 
"Those damages which are not the probable 
and necessary result of the injuries complained 
of are termed special damages, and, in order to 
recover such damages, they are required to be 
stated specially in the complaint. Citing cases 
tested hy this rule, the ailments suggested in the 
testimony affecting the general health, as well as 
the specified health, would have to be specifically 
pleaded." 
Neither could the court have awarded damages be-
cause of any theory that the net profits of the partner-
21 
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ship might have been increased if the partnership had not 
been denied the experience and wide personal contacts 
of the plaintiff. The District Court itself stated: 
"That it is easily conceivable that the net pro-
fits of the partnership might have been increased 
if the partnership had not been denied the experi-· 
ence and wide personal contacts of the plaintiff." 
(R. 485) 
The court thus recognized that there was no proof of that 
fact. Indeed, the court had already concluded that Gra-
ham had failed to show that the profits of the partner-
ship were materially and adversely affected by this ex-
clusion (R. 476). Even though the court had not itself 
answered this theory of liability, it is clear that ari award 
of damages cannot be made on the speculation that the 
plaintiff might have made better profits if he had been 
permitted to manage this business. See Alder vs. Cor-
sier, 50 Ut. 437; 168 Pac. 83. 
A more complete answer to this theory of recovery 
is that the Uniform Partnership Act only allows re-
covery of what the actual profits were and not what they 
might have been if the plaintiff had taken possession of 
the partnership property and operated it. The Uniform 
Partnership Act foreclosed a party from making such a 
contention by giving to the expelled party the absolute 
right to secure possession of the partnership property 
when he is expelled, and if he does not exercise that right, 
he is foreclosed from later taking the position that he 
could have done better. If he thought he could do better, 
all he needed to do was to apply to the court and the 
court forthwith would have granted him possession of 
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the property. Sec. 69-1-35 (2). (b): 
"The partners~ have not caused the dis-
solution wrongfully and if they all desire to con-
tinue the business in the same name, may do so 
during the agreed tenn of the partnership, and 
for that purpose Inay possess the partnership 
property; * * *" 
See Crossman vs. Gibney, 164 Wis. 395; 160 N.W. 
172. 
We respectfully submit therefore that there can be 
no foundation for the additional award of $5000.00 as 
compensatory damages, the plaintiff having been fully 
compensated for his entire loss by awarding him one-half 
of fue partnership profits. 
THIS IS NOT A PROPER CASE FOR THE ALLOWANCE 
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
This action is, in form, an action on contract and 
not sounding in tort. Exemplary or punitive damages 
are allowed in actions sounding in tort. See 84 A.L.R. 
at 1352: 
"Attention is here called to the cases above 
cited and set out under the general rule, holding 
that fraud for which no recovery in tort is sought, 
will not ordinarily justify the recovery of exem-
plary damages in an action for breach of con-
tract." · 
On the same page of this report the reason for the 
rule is stated: 
"The reason of the rule that confines the re-
covery in suits on contract to actual damages is 
believed to still prevail, although we have no 
forms of action. If, in ordinary litigation on con-
tracts, issues as to motives and exemplary dam-· 
ages to be allowed, the result would be greatly 
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to increase the intricacy and uncertainty of such 
litigation. The exclusion of such issues in suits on 
contract may be justified on the policy of limiting 
the uncertainties and asperities attending litiga-
tion of such issues to that class of cases in which 
the nature of the wrong complained of renders 
those issues and evils to some extent unavoid~ 
able." 
On a petition for rehearing in the case referred to in 
this report the court stated: 
"But counsel assert the right to sue in one 
action for a breach of contract and for damages 
for a tort, where both claims grow out of the same 
transaction and are so connected that they may 
conveniently and appropriately be litigated to-
gether. Thus qualified, this proposition is be-
lieved to be in accordance with the decisions in 
this state. But we regard the petition of plaintiff, 
insofar as it attempts to allege a tort and to re-
cover damages therefor, in addition to damages 
for a breach of contract, as substantially seeking 
a double recovery for the same wrong. The real 
purport of the petition was to claim damages for 
breach of contract, including profits lost by the 
breach, and to claim also exemplary damages be-
cause of alleged malice in committing the breach." 
An action for a dissolution of a partnership, while 
not strictly one for the breach of a contract, is never-
theless an action in contract, for the reason that when 
an accounting is sought there is an implied contract on 
the part of the expelling partner to pay the expelled 
partner the value of his interest, and in addition, that 
portion of the profits which are attributable to the use 
of the property. 
15 A.m. Juris. p. 709: 
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.. According to the overwheln1ing weight of 
authority, exe1nplary damages are not recovera;ble 
in actions for breach of eontraet, although there 
are dicta and intin1ations in some of the cases to 
the contrary. This rule does not obtain, however, 
in those exeeptional eases where the breach 
a1nounts to an independent, wilful tort, in which 
eYent exe1nplary dmnages may be recovered under 
proper allegations of Inalice, wantonness, or op-
pression-as, for exan1ple, in actions for breach 
of Inarriage contracts. r nder a ·statute providing 
that such damages may be awarded for the 
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, 
it has been held that they are recoverable in an 
action growing out of a breach of contract per-
meated with tort, where the injured party elects 
to waive the contract and recover in tort." 
Hobbs vs. Smith, 115 Pac. 34 7 at 350; 27 Okla. 830, 
34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 69: 
"But it is insisted that the court erred in sub-
mitting the question of exemplary damages pray-
ed for in the petition to the jury; the claim being 
made that this case was not one wherein exem-
plary damages could he allowed. It will be observ-
ed that the relationship between the parties grew 
out of a contract, wherein. plaintiffs bought and 
defendant sold the hogs. Our statute on exeln-
plary damages (section 2887, Con1. Laws Okla. 
1909) reads that "In any action for the breach of 
an obligation not arising from contract, where 
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud 
or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addi-
tion to the actual damage, may give damages for 
the sake of example, and by way of punishing 
the defendant. 
"The foregoing statute fixing liability for 
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exemplatory damages does so upon those obliga-
tions, not arising from contract, and is in har-
mony with the common law on this subject. 3 Page 
on Contracts, Sec. 1572; 1 Joyce on Damages Sec. 
111 ; 2 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) c. 20; 
Snow et al vs. Grace, 25 Ark. 570; Richardson 
vs. Wilmington, etc., Ry. Co., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S. 
E. 235; Ryder vs. Thayer et al, 3 La. Ann. 149; 
Ford vs. Fargason, 120 G. 708, 48 S. E. 180. And, 
although there are some few cases not in harmony 
the rule under the great weight of authority is 
well established that where a breach of contract 
is permeated with tort, the injured person may 
elect to waive the contract and recover in tort; 
or, differently stated, although the relation be-
tween the parties may have been established by 
contract, express or implied, if the law imposes 
certain duties because of the existence of that re-
lation, the contract obligation may be waived, and 
an action in tort maintained for the violation of 
such imposed duties." 
Utah does not have a statute stating when exem-
plary damages are to be allowed and follows the common 
law rule, but Utah has adopted the Uniform Partnership 
Act, which states what is recoverable where a partner-
ship at will is disrupted, and no provision is found 
therein allowing exemplary damages. Accordingly, none 
should be allowed. Where a statute sets up a rule deter-
mining the extent of liability, that. rule of liability is 
controlling and exclusive. 
If exemplary damages are allowed in this state in ac-
tions sounding in contract, then we submit that there are 
no facts in this case justifying the award of exemplary 
damages. See Tripp vs. Bagley, 75 Ut. 42; 282 Pac. 1026: 
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Hln the absence of any aet in reckless or wil-
ful disregard of plaintiff'~ right, or the doing of 
any lmnecessary or purely malicious injury to the 
plaintiff, we can see nothing in the language used 
by the defendant to illdil'ate any wilful intention 
to injure the plaintiff." 
This case also cites the earlier Utah case of Rugg vs. 
Tolman, 39 Ut. 295; 117 Pac. 54 at 57: 
''The law does not, and in the nature of things 
cannot, allow exemplary or punitive damages for 
Inere negligence, although gross, nor for mistakes 
that may affect the rights of others, unless some 
act or acts indicative of bad motives or an inten-
tion to oppress or wrongfully vex and harass an-
other is made manifest." 
We think that in the instant case this court would be 
justified in stating, as did the court in Tripp vs. Bagley, 
supra: 
"We find no basis in the evidence for the al-
lowance of exemplary damages." 
We make this assertion because we contend that in 
the instant case all that happened was that there was an 
assertion of a right by these parties which this court 
found these defendants did not have. 
The defendant, Street, contended that he· had not 
entered into a partnership with the plaintiff, Graham, 
and the defendant, Siegel, contended that he had not 
made a loan to the partnership, but the finding of the 
District Court and of this court is against those conten-
tions. There were neither facts pleaded nor proven to 
establish that either of these defendants acted mali-
ciously. Merely attempting to assert a right, which the 
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court found these defendants did not have, does not justi-
fy an award of exemplary damages. 
Bracht vs. Connell, 313 Pac. 397; 170 Atl. 297 (1933): 
"While appellants were not acting in bad 
faith in this transaction, but were doing what they 
believed they had every right to do, they were mis-
taken. The law demands they must faithfully w-
count to appellee; but the law places no greater 
penalty on them than they give appellee the value 
of his interest in that contract, reflected in this 
case by a proportion of the net profit after a de-
duction of all proper charges or costs." 
The Utah case of Haycraft vs. Adams, 24 Pac. (2) 
1110 at 1114 seems to be authority for both propositions 
which we assert, namely: that exemplary damages are 
allowed only in cases "where a tort is aggravated by 
evil motive" and also for the proposition that where there 
110 
. . d f l are ~ allegatwns to support a JU gment or exemp ary 
damages that they cannot be allowed. On the first of 
these propositions we quote from page 1115 of that case 
as follows: 
"Exe1nplary, punitive or vindicative dam-
ages are such damages as are in excess of the ac-
tual loss, and are allowed where a tort is aggra-
vated by evil motives, actual malice, deliberate vi-
olence, oppression or fraud. Murphy vs. Booth, 
36 Ut. 285; 103 Pac. 768 at 770." 
On the other proposition that exemplary damages 
are not allowed unless pleaded, this case states at 1114. 
as follows: 
"It is not necessary to discuss either the law 
or the evidence as to the matter of punitive dam-
ages. There are neither allegations nor proof 
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to support a Yerdict or judg1nent for exemplary 
or punitiYe drunage~. '' 
Even in an action for malicious prosecution our 
court found that it could not imply malice frmn the 
mere filing of a cmnplaint and termination favorable 
to the accused frmn which a motive prompting an inten-
tion to injure the accused could be inferred. So, too, in 
the instant case, the mere assertion of what these defend-
ants believed to be their legal rights cannot justify a find-
ing that they were malicious in asserting what they be-
lieved to be their r~ghts. In this case the only evidence 
is that the defendant, 'Street, was acquainted with Gra-
ham for a period of several years during which time they 
each operated tractors. It even appears from the evi-
dence that Street at various times tried to bring the 
three parties together in the hope of working out a solu-
tion to their misunderstandings. The defendant, Siegel, 
was hardly acquainted with the plaintiff and had only 
met him a short time before and there does not appear 
to be any basis for believing that that defendant acted 
maliciously. 
INTEREST ON PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING IS NOT 
ALLOW ABLE UNTIL A BALANCE OF ACCOUNT IS 
STRUCK. 
We only desire to add the citation of one case to the 
authorities already cited by the appellant, Siegel, in his 
brief on the question as to the date from which interest 
is allowable on a partnership accounting. See Harris vs. 
W. R. Hart & Company (Okla. 1944) 154 Pac. (2)759: 
":Manifestly it would be unfair to allow in-
terest in a cause of this nature. The proceeding 
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on appeal reveals that there never was a time !it 
which the parties could have concluded that a 
definite amount was due. Both parties are now 
asserting that the judgment is incorrect. The gen-
eral rule appears to be that, in the absence ·of an 
agreement to the contrary, interest is not to be al-
lowed on partnership accounts until after a bal-
ance is struck. 40 Am. Juris. Par. 354." 
In the instant case as soon as the Supreme Court af-
firmed the interlocutory order of the District Court by 
its decision in 1946, the defendants stated to the plain-
tiff's attorney that they would make available to him the 
books and records from which a partnership accounting 
could be taken and that they would pay whatever amo1mt 
this partnership accounting showed to be true. The 
District Court has now found that the accounting con-
tained in the books was, with very minor exception, cor-
rect. The plaintiff could have obtained the amount of the 
partnership accounting in 1946, except for the fact that 
the plaintiff then amended his complaint asking, instead 
of partnership profits, for a judgment in excess of One 
Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00). UndPr 
the circumstances in this case it would be inequitable to 
allow the plaintiff interest on the partnership accounting, 
aside from the fact ·that the general rule of partnership 
liability is as we have hereinabove stated .. 
THE PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING IS PRIMA FACIE 
CORRECT. 
The accounting that was submitted was found by 
the District Court to be substantially correct, but the 
court disallowed one item of expense set up in the ac-
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counting, namely: the premiwn paid for liability insur-
ance. The evidence on that point is that the insurance 
was for possible liability by reason of accidents occur-
ring by the operation of the partnership equipment. The 
evidence is that the item was paid and there is no con-
trary evidence. Defendants see no reason why this item 
of partnership expense should have been disallowed. See 
Bracht Ys. Connell, supra: 
"Appellants were surcharged with n1any 
items for which they sought credit because they 
were unable to subn1it vouchers, bills, cancelled 
checks and n1eet all the requirmnents of the nwst 
familiar proof. * * '" The cancelled checks, cor-
roborated by the testi1nony of the bookkeeper, 
who received the bills and made out the checks, 
by that of the partner who signed the checks, pay-
roll books showing the auw.unts paid and labor 
employed, ·and the trucks used, and all the oth~r 
customarily retained records of such a job, are 
prima facie proof of the facts therein contained, 
and cast the burden of proving such evidence false 
on the person who challenges it." 
In the instant case, proof was made that the expendi-
ture was made. None was offered that it was not made. 
CONCLUSION 
This defendant respectfully submits that the al-
lowance of a full one-half of all of the partnership 
profits earned during the entire operation is more than 
just as an award to the plaintiff. An end to this litiga-
tion ought to be reached. Since the accounting is not in 
dispute, this court could adjust for the several ite·ms 
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which have been disallowed by the District Court and 
strike the balance to be paid to the plaintiff, without the 
necessity of sending the matter back to the District 
Court, and we respectfully urge that action upon this 
court. 
Respectfully submitted., 
WHITE, WRIGHT & 
ARNOVITZ, 
32 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Evan E. Street. 
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APPENDIX A 
On August 6, 1943 the plaintiff and defendant, 
Street, entered into an agreement wherein they agreed 
to purchase certain equipment from the Bothwell Con-
struction Company for the sum of $4500.00 if they could 
get someone to finance the purchase and after they 
made the purchase that they would operate the equip-
ment in a sort of joint venture, with the defendant Street 
physically operating the equipment and receiving $1.50 
an hour for his labor; that all operating expenses and 
repairs should be paid, and that any profit left was to 
'be divided equally. Of course, the joint venture would 
also be required to pay the party who advanced the 
money on behalf of the joint venture, along with interest 
on that loan. Street· had on other occasions transacted 
business with Siegel and was acquainted with him, and 
Street suggested that he and Graham attempt to secure 
a loan from 'Siegel in order to purchase the equipment. 
Accordingly, Graham and Street went to Siegel's place 
of business and inquired whether he would be inter-
ested in making a loan in the amount of $4500.00 for 
the purchase of this equipment. 
Mr. Siegel's evidence on the trial of this action was 
that he refused to make a loan for the full amount of 
the purchase price, hut that he agreed to purchase the 
equipment. and then would enter into an agreement 
with Graham and Street for the operation of the equip-
ment. Btreet agreed that this was the arrangement 
made with Siegel, but Graham testified that Siegel 
had agreed to make a loan for the full purchase price 
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of $4500.00, and that in addition to the securing of the 
equipment purchased Graham was to give security on 
a truck of his, and Street was to give security on a 
house trailer of his. The court found the facts to be 38 
Graham testified and held that Siegel had made a loan 
in the amount of $4500.00, secured by a mortgage on the 
equipment purchased and by Graham's truck and Street's 
house trailer. 
No such mortgage was ever recorded for the simple 
reason that Graham signed a mortgage form in blank, 
and Street had signed another mortgage form in blank. 
At any rate the finding of the District Court, affirm-
ed by this court ,was that a loan in the amount of $4500,00 
had been made by Siegel, secured by mortgage. 
After Graham and Street had entered into an ar-
rangement to purchase the equipment from the Both-
well Construction Company and after some arrange. 
ments had been made with 'Siegel to finance the purchase 
of this equipment, the Bothwell Construction Company 
delivered a bill of sale to Siegel naming Graham as the 
purchaser of the equipment. Siegel refused to pay the 
$4500.00 to the Bothwell Construction Cmnpany until 
the bill of sale was changed naming himself as the 
purchaser of the equipment. 
The equipment was purchased on August 6th and 
Street worked on the equipment to get it repaired, and 
it was ready to operate on or about August 16th. Street 
had the equipment moved on to some jobs and com-
menced to work. However, Siegel had not yet com-
pleted his agreement with Graham and Street undei 
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the terms of which the equipn1ent would be leased to 
Grahrun and Street. Siegel tried on various occasions 
to haYe Grahmn and Street conte into his office and 
conclude this agreeruent, but it was not tmtil Septmnber 
~0, 1943, that Gralrrun consented to come to see Siegel. 
On Septernber ~0, 1943, Siegel had a disagreement with 
Graham, Grahan1 contending that their transaction was 
complete, that he and Street had sigried a note· and 
mortgage for the sum of $4500.00, bearing 9 per cent 
interest, and therefore that he and Street were entitled 
to the possession of this equipment. Street disagreed 
with Graham and stated that all he wanted was to get 
his wages for the tirne that he had been operating the 
equipment. According to Graham's pleading, on Septem-
ber 20, 1943, Siegel notified Graham that he (Siegel) 
was the sole owner of the equipment (Tr. 133 of evi-
dence on trial prior to interlocutory order). 
Between August 16, 1943 and September 22, 1943, 
Street operated this equipment under what Street and 
Siegel believed to be an agreement whereby Siegel leased 
the equipment to Graham and Street, under which lease 
each of the parties was to receive one-third of the net 
earnings. However, Graham contended that the equip-
ment was operated by Street as a member of the Graham 
and Street partnership, which owed $4500.00 to Siegel 
for the equipment and which partnership was to oper-
ate the equipment on an equal division of the profits. 
The court held with Graham's view and held that a 
partnership had been organized between Graham and 
Street; that Siegel was only entitled to the repayment 
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of his $4500.00, plus interest at 9o/o per annrnn. 
Graham had made no contribution to the partner 
ship other than to advance the su:nl of $15.00 for movin~ 
the equipment from one of the first jobs in Americar 
Fork to another job. Graham never operated the equip. 
ment and after September 22, 1943, Street informed 
Graham that there was no partnership agreement be-
tween himself and Graham. Street continued to operat€ 
this equipment under what he believed to be a leas€ 
from Siegel and continued to operate it until sometime 
in December, 1944, when he was getting ready to enter 
the United States Navy. 
Siegel had contended that no agreement had been 
concluded with Graham and Street because of Graham's 
failure to meet with Siegel and Street to conclude the 
execution of the necessary papers. Siegel retained the 
title certificate belonging to Graham until after the 
meeting of September 23, 1943, and within a few days 
thereafter he returned the title to Graham's truel( to 
Graham, advising him that he was returning it for the 
reason that Graham had not concluded the agreement 
with Mr. Siegel for the operation of the equipment. 
From September 22, 1943 forward Graham had nothing 
at all to do with the operation of the equipment or 
securing jobs, nor did he ever contribute to the partner-
~hip anything more than the $15.00 which he paid to 
move the equipment which is mentioned above. 
When this disagreement occurred on September 22, 
1943, Graham testified that he had stated: "I wouldn't 
want any more to do with his set up and that I would 
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immediately start arrange1nents to dissolve with Stre,_•t 
because I didn't like the idea of it at all, and Mr. Street 
if he was dissatisfied that the thing to do was to quit 
and we left with that understanding." (Tr. 33 of the 
evidence on trial prior to interlocutory order). 
Grahan1 further testified that within a week after 
September :2:2, 1943: "'I demanded of Street an account-
ing of what work had been done and what the 'cat' had 
earned, and was flatly refused. Told me as far as he was 
concerned and :Max that he didn't think that it was any 
of my business." (Tr. 44 of the evidence on trial prior 
to interlocutory order). 
The District Court and this court held that these 
facts did not show a dissolution of the partnership at 
will and that the partnership must be considered to have 
been operated for the benefit of Graham and Street. 
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